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It was reported that on a Nova Scotia fishing trip many years
ago, Ted Williams, the Boston Red Sox star hitter, and Sam
Snead, the standout golfer of his era, entered into a conversa-
tion concerning the relative difficulty of their two sports. It
went something like this:
Teddy Ballgame:“Sam,golf is easy.The ball just sits there
on the ground.When you’re good and ready, you hit it! In
baseball, I face a pitcher slinging the blurry white pill at 95
miles-per-hour! And I don’t get any second-chance
Mulligans like you golfers!”
Slamming Sammy responded:“Ted, every time you hit a
foul ball, you are really getting a Mulligan! You get to hit
the next pitch. In golf, we have to hit our foul balls from
wherever they’ve landed!”
While I’ve personally attained certain levels of incompe-
tence in both sports, I know from my entrepreneurial activ-
ities that we can draw two object lessons from this classic
conversation. First, it is generally moot to compare one par-
ticular challenging venture directly to another; a single dis-
similarity can outweigh all points of commonality. Second,
unless you cheat or passively await divine intervention, there
are no Mulligans in entrepreneurship to help you succeed.
You should intend, therefore, to meet the rigors of concep-
tualizing, implementing and operating your new business
venture without the benefit of “a free pass”. In this Age of
Entitlement—a term coined by Robert J. Samuelson
(1996)—increasing numbers of people seek the easy path.
There are few entitlements, however, for small business, and
the entrepreneur should look in the mirror for self-help.
Entrepreneurship requires serious, well-focused endeavors
and an enormous amount of blood, sweat and tears! Good
decision-making entails all that effort—plus unbiased and
intelligent sorting of alternate actions.
The statistics of success in decision-making suggest that
entrepreneurs face daunting odds. In the chaotic world of
venturing, you are expected to be near perfect. You must
succeed at each step of the business development journey.
Ted Williams, by contrast, failed to get a hit more than 6
times out of 10.At each hole, Sam Snead generally needed 3
to 5 shots to get the ball in the cup. Sports metaphors
undoubtedly trivialize the plight of the would-be entrepre-
neur. In striving to be near perfect, entrepreneurs confront a
series of complex tasks: planning, product/service develop-
ment, marketing, financing, operations/organization build-
ing, and sales.
The road map for a new venture can be depicted by a
complicated, occasionally impressive, decision tree that
sequences these tasks in a cascade of branching actions
and outcomes (Ulvila and Brown 1982). The underlying
logic, thankfully, can be simplified. If the conditional prob-
ability (i.e., conditional upon the previous venture stages
being successful) of each of these six stages is a
respectable 80 percent, the probability of success is only
26 percent (0.86)! Not good enough for many early-stage
investors. Improving each of the conditional probabilities
to 90 percent produces a 53 percent probability of suc-
cess.You’ll still fail half the time! Success and bad decisions
obviously don’t mix well!
Dilemmas Influencing Decision-Making
When we analyze how small business CEOs make choices, we
are reminded that in the hierarchy of decision influences, sur-
vival heads the list. Staying alive, however, cannot be taken for
granted. Risk abounds. Small business continues, nevertheless,
as an important subset of a dynamic economy.
Small and emerging companies contribute both job cre-
ation importance and volatility to our economy. The Wall
Street Journal (Bounds 2004) recently culled some data from
the Small Business Administration that underscore the extent
to which small firms permeate, if not dominate, the U.S.econ-
omy.
Small businesses:
 employ half of all private sector employees;
 generate 60–80 percent of all new jobs annually; and
 pay 44.3 percent of total U.S. private payroll.
Life cycles of business births and deaths in 2003:
 business births—572,900
Joseph E. Levangie
S ome of the best entrepreneurs fail early and often.Less talented or less committed entrepreneurs do noteven get a second chance.Failure and setbacks, how-
ever, can be instructive.What lessons can be learned from
these experiences? How can the entrepreneur (and
investors) navigate around the potholes on the New
Venture Highway? Read on.
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 terminations—554,800
 bankruptcies—35,037 
The real dilemmas an entrepreneur faces in decision-mak-
ing—which can ultimately threaten his survival—involve all
the usual factors: external factors beyond the firm’s control;
competition; financing difficulties; operational problems;per-
sonal problems of the entrepreneur; and calamities, including
fraud, natural disasters and theft.
External Factors
The entrepreneur has little control over external factors. His
(or her) decisions should be crafted, however, with an
informed sensitivity to the company’s changing environ-
ment.A few years ago, when the dot.com bubble burst, thou-
sands of development stage companies were swept under in
its wake. Dozens of New England companies canceled or
postponed their IPOs. Many entrepreneur-investors took a
severe financial “haircut,” laid off people, closed operations,
watched loans go bad and, at not an insignificant cost,
acquired new-born humility. Diminution of personal net
worth aside, the rigors of an economic downturn can intro-
duce much needed discipline to the entrepreneur.The dilem-
ma of a nasty business climate has, ironically, reintroduced
old basic concepts such as “bootstrapping” and “moonlight-
ing” (Denison 2000) to venture decision-making. The harsh
reality requires the entrepreneur to squeeze incremental
value out of scarce available resources. This renewed disci-
pline serves well to remind CEOs that the crazed days of
investors throwing funds at deals is history; that party is over
and it’s time to sober up!
In addition to the vicissitudes of the economy, there are
other external decision-making challenges for the CEO
imposed by new regulations.An important regulatory exam-
ple is the ever-present Sarbanes-Oxley (S-Ox) with its
requirements for improved corporate governance. Berry
(2004) reports that while presently only public companies
need comply with S-Ox regulations, it is possible that some
offshoot of S-Ox will ultimately apply to privately-held firms
as well as not-for-profits.The real decision tree for the entre-
preneur is whether to become S-Ox compliant now, or wait
until the rule extension is imposed; and how to craft an exit
position for investors—be it an IPO or a buy-out by a publicly
held company. In either case S-Ox compliance will be neces-
sary. Still, I find many entrepreneurs staunchly resisting S-Ox
under the guise that compliance is expensive and they’re sav-
ing money. It is like the old Fram oil filter commercial—“You
can pay me now or you can pay me later!”
Competitive Factors
An enlightening acid test to see if an entrepreneur really
knows his business is to ask,“How do you rate your compe-
tition?” Having interviewed well in excess of a thousand
entrepreneurs over three decades, I would assess—anecdo-
tally—that a full third of these would-be captains of industry
give a knee-jerk response of “Oh, we really don’t have any
competition!” Wrong answer! The essential dilemma is that
the company’s strategic decisions cannot be made in a com-
petitive vacuum.
If one learns nothing else in an MBA program, one should
remember to address strategic issues by employing the ven-
erable notion of SWOT—Strengths, Weaknesses,
Opportunities & Threats. CFO Magazine reports (Durfee
2004) that the typical reaction for CEOs is to use half of
SWOT—to focus on the positives of the external business
environment and to deemphasize the negatives. When bad
things happen to these good entrepreneurs—say the flop of
a new product launch—it is not credible for them to blame
“bad luck” if the risks of competitive threats have not been
considered.The better you analyze critical decisions, the bet-
ter your “luck!”
Over the last 25 years, the reigning guru of competitive
analysis has been Michael Porter of the Harvard Business
School, supplanting the Boston Consulting Group with its
“experience curve”(“profitability is directly related to market
share”), so ballyhooed in the ‘60s and ‘70s. Warsh (1994)
reports that Porter imputes four competitive forces impact-
ing the profitability of an industry:
1. rivalry among existing firms;
2. the bargaining power of both buyers and suppliers;
3. the threat of new entrants to the business; and
4. the threat of potential substitute products.
Porter introduced the “value chain” framework of interre-
lated marketing functions (customer base, brand name, distri-
bution, service).The value chain contributes to the strength
of a firm’s product presence and calls attention to the com-
petitive advantages that many big companies enjoy.
Entrepreneurs, who often view big firms as outmoded
dinosaurs, need to assess realistically the competitive risk of
all market participants in the marketplace—including large
firms—in the course of strategic decision-making.
How does the enlightened entrepreneur discover more
about the competition? While there are no Mulligans in this
arena, there are ways to improve your odds. Caulfield (2004)
reports that initiating the proper due diligence is key. The
right “course management” involves culling data from the
public domain, overlaying your knowledge about your own
company with that of the industry, and connecting the dots
to draw patterns. Specific steps include:
 Research easily accessible databases to determine com-
petitors’ health.
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 Check competitors’ Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) quarterly and annual filings at
www.sec.gov to find product line margins, customer
base, research spending, and personnel background.
 Check competitors’ credit with Dun & Bradstreet,
which will sell you detailed reports for $122 each.
 Creatively dig up important competitor information.
 Attend professional courses taught by competitors’
management which might reveal their private finan-
cial and marketing information.
 Access competitors’presentations to analysts at invest-
ment conferences and on conference calls which
might represent the informational mother lode (e.g., I
once plugged into the conference call of my biggest
competitor, asked a question, and obtained an answer
that swayed a critical strategic decision of our emerg-
ing company!).
 Check the Help Wanted pages to see if competitors
are hiring; and if so, what kind of technical skills they
are seeking.
 Analyze your foes’web sites.Email some queries to the
web master—who knows, maybe he will spill the
beans on something important and proprietary!
 On the defense, assume that turnabout is fair play.
 Be careful to screen all your company’s web site post-
ings, press releases, presentations and vendor discus-
sions.
 Compartmentalize information among your compa-
ny’s different departments.Apple Computer, for exam-
ple, can trace internal leaks because it assigns differ-
ent code names to different departments for the same
development project.
 As appropriate, if threatened by overseas rip-off com-
panies, have some fun. If your company needs to file a
patent (that works), file several others that do not
work and have the foreign firms waste their reverse
engineering budget chasing a red herring!
Financing Factors
The area of finance is where the aspiring entrepreneur gen-
erally has the biggest dilemma in decision-making. Issues
abound.
 How much capital do we need? When do we run out?
 What kind of capital should we seek with what struc-
ture?
 Where do we find the investors?
 How much will it cost our ownership in terms of dilu-
tion and control?
 What is involved in negotiations?
 How do we close the deal?
A cute ode by DeGarmo (1991) regarding an entrepre-
neur’s quest for funding reflects well the financial decision-
making climate:
We were hungry for money, our nerves were all frayed.
To survive, our expenses could NOT be delayed.
In the past our agreements on handshakes were made.
We just did not know how this new game was played
As we battled each crisis of mistimed receipts
We bluffed, we negotiated, made impassioned entreats.
The nights we spent tossing and whipping the sheets.
The days were reserved for strategic retreats.
Now we’re losing our stakes, being left with the rinds,
From those equity penalties we shouldn’t have signed.
We brushed off our lawyers.We were caught in a bind,
By those last-minute threats: “We’re changing our
minds.”
In late 2004, there is good news and bad news for entre-
preneurs as they consider capital raise-ups.The bad news is
that while venture capitalists invested $833 million in 74
deals in New England companies in the second quarter of
2004, according to an Ernst & Young report (Witkowski
2004), only 32 percent of the deals involved seed or first
round financings. The remainder went to bolster existing
portfolio companies.The good news is that venture capital is
not the only source of funds. Gennari (2004) reports that of
Inc. Magazine’s 2003 list of the 500 fastest-growing compa-
nies, only 2 percent used venture capital as their source for
start-up funding,and more than 70 percent were started with
$100K or less. Healy (2004) reports that private investor
groups, such as the Lexington, Massachusetts, Common
Angels, are dramatically increasing their deal review activi-
ties.The dilemma for entrepreneurs is how to tap in on these
positive developments.
Operational Factors
Peter Drucker (2004) has consulted to business for 65 years.
His recent writings address several aspects of the operational
dilemma of decision-making.Drucker concludes that success-
ful managers can be “charismatic or dull, generous or num-
bers oriented.” But every effective executive followed eight
simple practices:
1.They asked,“What needs to be done?”
2.They asked,“What is right for the enterprise?”
3.They developed action plans.
4.They took responsibility for decisions.
5.They took responsibility for communicating.
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6. They were focused on opportunities rather than prob-
lems.
7. They ran productive meetings.
8. They thought and said “we” rather than “I.”
Drucker explains, “The first two practices gave them the
knowledge they needed.The next four helped them convert
this knowledge into effective action.The last two ensured that
the whole organization felt responsible and accountable.”
Entrepreneurs who remain blind to this kind of invaluable
advice are far more likely to make decision errors.
Personal Factors
Among the unfavorable traits you might find in an entrepre-





 lack of relationship-building; and
 emotional immaturity.
As chronicled in the article “The Young and the Clueless”
(Bunker et al. 2002), such negative personal characteristics
outweigh, in case after case, the benefits of being high-ener-
gy, intelligent and aggressively hard-working. I regrettably
have my own war stories of unfortunate personal traits in
entrepreneurs confounding otherwise normal decision-mak-
ing:
 A London investment banker looked over at our techni-
cal founder/CEO and quietly asked me if his secretary
might not take our “boy entrepreneur out shopping so
the rest of us can complete the financing.”
 A cofounder and CEO in one of our technology compa-
nies was so emotionally committed to the company’s
original target market that he could not concur with the
board of directors’ decision to change direction and tar-
get a larger,more quickly accessible, faster growing,high-
er margin market. Despite being a large shareholder, he
defamed the company to Wall Street, and started to spiral
emotionally out of control. With an armed guard on
premises, the board of directors voted him out of the
company.Thankfully, no shots were fired! This entrepre-
neur’s self-destructive decision-making remains, howev-
er, a dilemma to many of us, years later.
Calamities, Fraud and Other Surprise Factors
A question for the ages: If fortunes are destined to go really
bad for your company, would you rather mess up on your
own or have it “done to you?” This dilemma is not really a
binary decision since the choice for some entrepreneurs
depends on whether the calamity is an act of God (e.g., a
flood) or an act of man (e.g., fraud). Some of us can—reluc-
tantly—accept outcomes beyond our control (e.g., the
dot.com market bubble burst) far easier than fraud by a trust-
ed member of the entrepreneurial team:
 The CEO of a firm we were acquiring dropped dead only 20
minutes before signatures on the closing documents were
to be obtained, thereby aborting the deal (sad,but the kind
of busted deal which we can understand and accept).
 The CEO of a newly public development-stage company
that we helped sponsor took a two-month post-IPO vaca-
tion to Australia on company funds to improve his tennis
game after his eight-year struggle to raise funds (fraudu-
lent and unacceptable,of course, leading to his dismissal,
and forfeiture of his 40% equity interest).
Watkins and Bazerman (2003) suggest that signals of future
calamities generally lie all around us and it is up to us to be
astute enough to recognize them.Truly out-of-the-blue surpris-
es aside, these researchers employ a concept called the “RPM
process”: recognition, prioritization, and mobilization.
 Recognition
 Marshal resources to scan the environment for emerg-
ing threats.
 Analyze and interpret the data.
 Prioritization
 Brainstorm the possible surprises.
 Analyze the cost-benefit of such consequences.
 Prioritize those threats with the highest costs.
 Mobilization
 Select the most serious threats.
 Take precautionary measures commensurate with
risks.
The Entrepreneurial Decision-maker
I have always found it fascinating to observe how business
decisions are made. Large corporations—to their CYA cred-
it—need to get consultants on board,purchase pricey market
research reports, and conduct a seemingly endless chain of
meetings. Some sessions may even be held off-site to stimu-
late the (presumptive) latent, lateral-thinking juices of the
management team.Only then can they line up “the right play-
ers” to deliver “the big green light” of approval. Time is not
usually deemed as critical; in fact, the time needed for a deci-
sion tends to be an exponential function of the number of
people involved.A sidebar to this contorted decision route is
the university setting where some schools actually flaunt
their “committee on committees”as a desirable level of facul-
ty involvement in the decision-making process.
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In contrast, on dozens of occasions I have witnessed an
entrepreneur take less than 90 seconds to make a monumen-
tal decision. Often while eating, and dripping pizza slime
over an original document for his signature, he will ask a few
key questions and say aye or nay. The ramifications of his
instant decision might impact 150 percent of the company’s
cash balance or 30 percentage points in the venture’s proba-
bility of success.“No matter,”says the entrepreneur,“time is of
the essence!” He continues eating.
This dichotomy of decision-making approaches under-
scores a certain conundrum: Can a professional manager
become an entrepreneur or can an entrepreneur act like a
manager? As O’Neal (1993) reports, even the venerable Peter
Drucker skirted this issue in his writings on the subject by
disclaiming that he would not discuss “psychology and char-
acter traits” of entrepreneurs. O’Neal notes, “While
[Drucker’s] probably right that the nuts and bolts of entre-
preneurship can be studied and learned, the soul of an entre-
preneur is something else altogether.”
Amen, amen. So it comes to pass I will take a stab at deci-
phering this quandary of the entrepreneurial soul. Some
observers of the scene, of course, believe that certain entre-
preneurs whom they’ve encountered are, in fact, soul-less!
The issue facing business schools, for example, is that the
principles and mechanics of entrepreneurship can be taught,
but the notions of creativity,drive and appetite for risk-taking
remain well below the surface.
Prospective entrepreneurs come in all colors, sizes and
shapes. Few are obvious daredevils or snake oil salespeople.
Not many are impulsive or flamboyant. Most have an entre-
preneurial idea and an intense need to exploit that idea “their
way.” O’Neal (1993) reports on a Purdue University study on
why entrepreneurs “take the plunge.” Based on 2,995 people
who had decided to go into business for themselves, they
responded “very important” to the following reasons
(approximate percentage responses):
 to use my skills/ability 56%
 to gain control over my life 54%
 to build for the family. 52%
 to pursue the challenge 48%
 to live how/where I like 32%
 to gain respect/recognition 19%
 to earn lots of money 18%
 to fulfill other’s expectations 9%
 to follow the best alternative available 7%
One can interpret this underlying motivation for the entre-
preneurship life in the framework of decision-making traits,
quirks and weaknesses by addressing the following:
 Does the stage of business life impact how decisions are
made?
 How do personality and power/control issues impact
choices?
 What type of bias creeps into decisions? 
 What is the consequence of the decision-making
methodology?
Stages of One’s Decision-Making Life
Bennis (2004) references Shakespeare’s seven ages of man
(As You Like It) with a remarkable combination of business
and literary acumen. Paraphrasing the Avon bard, Bennis
applies the following seven stages to the development of
leadership, and, derivatively, decision-making:
1.The “infant executive” needs a mentor before he’s even
given the leadership job. He must recruit a real team to
back him up. His decision mistakes are typically from
inexperience.
2.“The schoolboy, with shining face” as a first-time leader,
is potentially unnerved by the spotlight and scrutiny
surrounding his initial words and actions.He senses that
he has only one chance to make a first impression. New
team members will show either trust or distrust, either
support or resistance—yet some of the negative feed-
back on his decisions may actually be accurate. His
errors in decision-making may stem from nervously
looking over his shoulder.
3.“The lover, with a woeful ballad” experiences the dilem-
mas of setting new boundaries in leading his former col-
leagues. Evaluation of his team’s job performance, strat-
egy formulation, and task prioritization can be in poten-
tial conflict with his “loving” relationships with his old
cronies.His decision errors often emanate from the con-
fusion of changing relationships.
4.“The bearded soldier” becomes comfortable with his
leadership position.A danger evolves that he may forget
the visceral impact of his words and decisions on his
staff. As a result, his team may only tell him what they
think he wants to hear.The true leader avoids this com-
munications barrier by being open with his people. He
may decide to hire talent better than himself and praise
them for their accomplishments, rather than being jeal-
ous at their stars glowing perhaps brighter than his.
Conversely, the degree to which the entrepreneur might
have any self-doubt about his own shortcomings can
create a nonrational (and possibly an irrational) deci-
sion-making environment.
5.“The general, full of wise saws” becomes arrogant and
does not see or hear the dangers around him. Like
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, he does not heed the sooth-
sayer’s Ides of March warning or Calpurnia’s pleas.
Arrogance can keep the “general” from building
alliances and coalitions in his senior team that will pro-
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vide him with valuable input and the “reality check” he
needs for his difficult decision-making.He lectures a lot,
listens little.
6.“The statesman, with spectacles on nose” is in a position
to pass on his wisdom without worries of personal
ambition. For short periods of time, the statesman can
be quite effective in making important and difficult
decisions without personal career considerations.
7.“The sage, second childishness” is the older mentor who
wants to create a legacy by imparting knowledge to a
younger generation of entrepreneurs and to provide
structure for more mature decision-making. The sage
reminisces, orates and teaches.
One of my all-time favorite business shrinks, Abraham
Zaleznik (1967), penned the following, back when I was a
mere youth in his first-year HBS class:
One of the major contributions of psychoanalytic psychology has
been to demonstrate the place of conflict in the development of
the individual. Each stage in the life cycle involves personal con-
flict because the individual has the task of giving up one set of
gratifications and searching for alternatives that take account
simultaneously of biological, psychological, and social chal-
lenges. Failure to relinquish gratifications impedes development,
while overly rapid learning establishes a gap between instinctu-
al-emotional processes, on the one hand, and cognitive-rational
capacities, on the other. This gap leads often to a highly rigid set
of conditions for the exercise of competence.
Whereas I might characterize an egregiously misbehaving
entrepreneur as “a **** jerk,”Dr. Zaleznik would say it with so
much more panache!
Personality and the Need for Power
Whenever I meet an entrepreneur for the first time, I know
that there’s a 95 percent chance I’ll be encountering a Type-
A personality. He or she will likely be bright, aggressive,
impatient and egocentric. That’s the easy part. Which of
these entrepreneurs will be successful (and why) is more
challenging to assess. Here’s where good and bad decision-
making comes into play. Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries (Coutu
2004) has devoted his life’s work to understanding how
capable, visionary and inspiring executives can, neverthe-
less, make irrational decisions. This has led him into the
fields of psychiatry and psychoanalysis to study the com-
plexities of the business leader. Ket de Vries observes:
“People in mental hospitals are easy to understand because
they suffer from extreme conditions. The mental health of
senior executives is much more subtle—[leaders] are insult-
ed to hear that certain things in their minds are uncon-
scious. But like it or not, people have blind spots, and the
non-rational personality needs of decision makers can seri-
ously affect the management process.”
Another analytical framework involves the laws of the jun-
gle—more specifically, chimpanzees. Dutch primatologist
Frans de Waal (Lesly 1995) has studied chimps and views evo-
lutionary psychology as a useful backdrop for explaining the
subtle jockeying and constant gamesmanship of the work-
place. Chimps demonstrate that the leader cannot allow him-
self to be too aggressive since his lieutenants will then dedi-
cate themselves to finding a way to topple him. Our innate
ape-like aggression may well derive from our inherited gene
pool!
The entrepreneurial animal may extend this pattern of
behavior.Without the counterbalance of investors—through
the board of directors—or trusted advisors, an unbridled
bully entrepreneur can desensitize employees, cause organi-
zational neurosis and induce a chain of nonrational decisions.
The bully personality takes many forms, as reported by Carey
(2004):
 The snake—Jekyll-and-Hyde type who badmouths you
behind your back while smiling to your face
 The screamer—a fist-pounder who exhibits public dis-
plays of bravado, if not real rage
 The nitpicker—an insulter who employs insinuation to
erode the confidence of his underlings
 The gatekeeper—a cold and controlling “god” who plays
favorites, permitting some employees to succeed and
withholding resources from others
Bias
Decision-making is rarely objective.An entrepreneur’s distort-
ed perception of the world often impacts his decision-mak-
ing reality. Bias can be introduced in a number of ways.
Anti-managerial Bias. Kaplan (1987) writes that once
the hero worship surrounding the vogue of entrepreneur-
ship wears off, entrepreneurship may devolve to being
viewed as a cliché by critics in large companies and just
another opportunity for a hustle. In physics, every action has
an equal and opposite reaction. So too it is with entrepre-
neurs. The chasm between entrepreneurs and professional
managers often rivals that of two political parties.The entre-
preneur may view the large corporate manager as stodgy and
overly protective of his backside.A suggestion to an entrepre-
neur that a corporate - type might be innovative or enlight-
ened is deemed as oxymoronic as vegetarian meatloaf.
This entrepreneurial bias can preemptively eliminate any
opportunity for collaboration with big companies. In two dif-
ferent companies, we have had a founder make a knee-jerk
reaction, dismissing out-of-hand the prospect of a strategic
alliance with a Fortune 500 company. In each case, it was a
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terrible decision.A subset of this bias is the anti-MBA bias in
the engineering community. Roberts (1992) suggests,
“Though their attitude is beginning to change, engineers still
regard people in management schools as irrelevant or stereo-
typically crass.”
Metaphorical Bias. We are all guilty of using buzz
phrases from other disciplines as a crutch to communicate
the virtues of our own little venture. We might reference
guerilla marketing (from military science), viral marketing
(from epidemiology) or the Internet bubble (from physics).
I’ve demonstrated earlier (with Mulligans), that we can tap
into a wealth of sports metaphors. As von Ghyczy (2003)
notes, metaphors are a useful complement to business mod-
els:“Metaphors can be good or bad, brilliantly or poorly con-
ceived, imaginative or dreary—but they cannot be true.”We
had one entrepreneur who would not agree to any decision
unless it could be explained in battlefield terms. War com-
parisons, of course, can help in certain aspects of strategy
formulation, but fall short in others—say, customer satisfac-
tion!
The Bias of Optimism. When the entrepreneur sup-
presses pessimistic opinions from his team while rewarding
optimistic ones, the venture team’s ability to think critically
is thereby undermined. Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) com-
ment that while optimism is not a bad trait, it generates more
in the way of moral-boosting enthusiasm than decision-relat-
ed realism.Although optimism enables people to be resilient
in confronting difficult challenges, it is less helpful in con-
tributing to difficult, realistic decision-making involving large
sums of investor money.
Ethical Bias. Some of my best business friends have
acted unethically at one time or another. One entrepreneur
was fined millions of dollars by the federal government for
performing and invoicing the same contracted R&D [Small
Business Innovative Research (SBIR)] work for different fed-
eral agencies. Gellerman (1986) addresses how usually hon-
est, intelligent, compassionate colleagues can act in ways
that are callous, dishonest and wrongheaded. He cites four
rationalizations that have long been used to justify question-
able behavior: “(1) believing that the activity is not ‘really’
illegal or immoral; (2) that it is in the individual’s or the cor-
poration’s best interest; (3) that it will never be found out; or
(4) that because it helps the company the company will con-
done it.”
The old situational ethics issues emerge: How far is too
far? What’s the line between being smart, and being—as the
Brits say—too smart by half? Such ethical bias undermines
decision-making and may introduce considerable downside
risk.
Decision Methodology
The entrepreneur can encounter decision pitfalls in the very
methodology he employs in making decisions. Simple deci-
sions sometimes are not that simple. Decision-making can
succeed or fail based on the logic of the decision structure,
the initialization values used, the kind of financial variables
employed and available information.
Time Sequence. Typically, we think “backwards” in time
to diagnose historic patterns and intuit possible chains of
causation.We think “forward”in time,using variables in math-
ematical formulation, to predict or assess future outcomes.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1987) argue that forward and back-
ward decision-making are interdependent and can be com-
bined to improve decision-making. A simple example:“How
do we get there from here and what are the consequences?”
Targeted future scenarios can be rolled back to influence cur-
rent decision-making.
Anchoring and Adjustment. Entrepreneurs often make
forecasts or estimates for decision-making by starting with a
favorable, easily available reference value and making adjust-
ments to that value. Often the anchor value is either a result
of too much optimism or an oversimplified rule -of-thumb.
The ultimate decision can thereby be skewed by the initial
anchoring value, and may result in unfortunate outcomes
with undue risk.
Framing. A decision is impacted by the way it is struc-
tured, or framed.As Teach (2004) suggests, if a frame is poor-
ly presented, an entrepreneur can unwittingly make an
“unprofitable” decision. An example might be whether to
frame a decision using gross margin (a financial accounting
number) or contribution margin (a cost-accounting number).
Not acknowledging the distinction between fixed and vari-
able costs can sway the decision—say, whether to accept a
contract at a certain price—the wrong way.
Data. Is a little knowledge a dangerous thing? Apparently
not always. Sutcliffe and Weber (2003) contend that the
accuracy of information is less important in decision-making
than the way in which the entrepreneur interprets his com-
petitive environment. If the entrepreneur structures the
decision correctly—with the right time sequence,anchoring
and framing—then the decision analysis should be okay; if
the structure is not correct, perfectly accurate information
won’t save the day.Again, there are no Mulligans in entrepre-
neurship!
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Parting Shots—Do’s and Don’ts
The Don’ts—Where the Snakes in the
Grass Lie
The list of decisions not to make is long enough to fill a shelf
full of business texts. I choose to identify four major areas of
dangerous decision-making.
The Wrong Choice of Business Target. No entrepre-
neurial activity proceeds exactly according to the business
plan.The size of the market can be misjudged, as can the tim-
ing of its maturation. The barriers to market entry can be
underestimated. Competition can be minimized or ignored
completely. In my venturing past, there have been several
companies that initially targeted the wrong market. I dis-
cussed previously the case of the stubborn CEO who was dis-
missed for not redirecting the company in a more profitable
direction.Two successful examples of flexible decision-mak-
ing in start-ups come to mind.
 A solar electric company changed its target from power
generation to power conversion (uninterruptible power
supplies), transforming it from a technological curiosity
to a major corporation that now has revenues over $1
billion and over 6,000 employees.
 A color -matching company was redirected from the den-
tal market to the retail paint market, resulting in prof-
itable sales and a successful IPO on the London Stock
Exchange.
Sometimes the decision to reconsider and reassess the
business concept represents a series of “small correc-
tions” that can add up to a substantial and positive
change. In the case of Il Giornale, an espresso bar,
Szulanski and Winter (2002) report that the founder was
eventually convinced to stop piping in Italian opera,
which customers universally disliked, and to not force
the servers to sport uncomfortable bowties, which
made them grouchy. Was it worth the decision to
change? Upon its renaming, the store morphed into
Starbucks!
The Wrong Decision Regarding People. Back in the
‘70s, I attended a seminar at MIT’s Sloan School that featured
Admiral Hyman Rickover, "father" of our nuclear navy pro-
gram.When asked about the biggest obstacle to success, the
diminutive military man snapped,“People! The moment you
hire your first employee, you have personnel problems!”One
need not be a misanthropic nuclear engineer to be wary of
the “people issue.”
We employ a simple question to bedevil many entrepre-
neurs:“Why did you hire each member of your staff?”While
some of these hot shots provide rationales, others—in the
mode of a cranky three -year -old—whine,“Well, because.…”
Consider how important having a good staff is:
 For years, the mantra in the Boston venture capital com-
munity has been that deals are more successful if one has
a grade B idea with grade A people than a grade A idea
with grade B people.The logic is that the entrepreneur-
ial environment is highly dynamic, and flexibility in
strategic decision-making is required (witness the previ-
ously cited cases where the company’s target market was
redirected).This means no relatives or high school bud-
dies are brought on board unless they would have been
hired from their resumes, references and interviews.
Same thing for the (occasional) “idiot sons” of angel
investors; you take in funds for the merits of your ven-
ture, not for executive baby-sitting! I’ve walked from
countless deals when I see that the company has a num-
ber of clueless hangers-on who are there because of “spe-
cial circumstances.”As the popular phrase goes, the clue
train stops regularly and these folks simply don’t take
delivery!
 When early-stage funds are obtained for a venture, some
founders tend to overhire staff, perhaps to off-load some
of the workload or, in some cases, to serve as palpable
testimony to their success-to-date. While, in principle,
labor is a variable cost—the reality is that added payroll
becomes an integral part of the monthly “nut” that must
be covered by revenues, vendors (accounts payable) or
investors (cash). Further, as benefits are added to attract
the best and the brightest talent, overhead expenses can
escalate. Stires (2004) reports that in the critical area of
medical insurance, the average annual premium per indi-
vidual, paid by employers, is projected to increase from
$9,608 in 2003 to $14,565 in 2006. Bad decisions in per-
sonnel have costly repercussions.
 The shelf life of the individual entrepreneur must be
monitored carefully for on-going viability.There is a con-
cept of “entrepreneurial nostalgia” that might be
observed. Many company founders have difficulty cop-
ing with the steady-state calmness of a smoothly run-
ning operation. They crave that old-time adrenaline
surge associated with survival and crisis management.
They try to recapture past feelings of being really need-
ed—a big boost to their ego affirmation. On one occa-
sion, I monitored my own shelf life and decided that I
was sufficiently bored with the calmness of success in a
company that I cofounded. I made a personnel decision:
I “fired”myself! On that deal,my entrepreneurial warran-
ty had expired!
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Self-Destructive Decisions in Financial Dynamics. I am
a devout believer in modeling the financial dynamics of an
enterprise on a regular basis. The very act of building the
financial model forces the entrepreneur to think through in
detail the key elements of the operation in an integrated
manner. Many entrepreneurs will agree with me up to this
point. They demur, however, when it comes to justifying
input data (e.g.,purchase orders/letters of intent for sales,bill
of materials for cost of goods sold,payroll for labor costs, and
so on) and testing the validity of key assumptions. I believe
strongly that most critical decisions can be assessed a priori
on a “what if”basis.The resistance to this desirable discipline
in decision-making evolves from several rationales:
 The information is not available.
 The information is not “knowable” (a Donald Rumsfeld-
esque term-of-art).
 “We’re not a big company, and I don’t have time to waste
on these fantasy exercises just to make the board of
directors and investors happy!.
 “I don’t understand!”
Without such analytical discipline to support entrepre-
neurial decision-making, important errors can crop up.
 The ramp-up of sales can be overstated.
 The cost of goods sold can be incomplete and therefore
understated (gross margins are thereby inflated).
 The build-up in personnel cannot be justified by the lev-
els of revenues and gross profit.
 Expense pools can build up too fast.
 Cash flows are less well assessed, diminishing the accu-
racy of capital planning.
 Less contingency planning occurs.
Given that there are no Mulligans in entrepreneurial deci-
sion-making, studying the venture’s financial dynamics with
an integrated model is a unique opportunity to make “mis-
takes” merely on paper, without suffering the cash conse-
quences of real-world decision errors.
Ongoing Errors in Strategic Decision-making. Don’t
target a market that is too small for your mission, your oper-
ational infrastructure or your investors’ expectations.
Don’t Overly Focus on One Product, Particularly as
the Company Becomes Robust and Profitable. The only
direction a successful one-product operation takes is towards
lower market share, lower prices and eroded margins. An
example is Sharper Image. Lee (2004) reports that the com-
pany’s Ionic Breeze air purifier represents 40 to 50 percent
of company revenues, and the cheaper knock-offs from
Brookstone and others have slowed Sharper Image’s sales
and slashed its profits.
Don’t Forget to Bootstrap Activities Whenever Pos-
sible. Conservation of cash is a golden rule.
 Virtual CFOs and accountants can be hired on a part-time
basis to minimize staff expense while assuring proper
reporting to investors and banks.
 Outsourcing is now so popular that venture capitalists
routinely ask,“What’s your India plan?”
Don’t Leave the Company Open to Fraud. We don’t
want people spending the precious resources of the compa-
ny on themselves! We don’t want counterfeiting of company
checks or the fraudulent issuance of checks to nonexistent
employees or vendors. Wolf and Company (2004) reports
that 1.2 million worthless checks enter the banking system
each day, and only about 13 percent of check fraud losses are
ever recovered. It is recommended that you:
 Use secure check stock (treated inks, safety papers).
 Maintain tight security over the check stock.
 Reconcile bank statements and report any losses imme-
diately.
 Conduct periodic audits.
Don’t Forget to Protect Proprietary Assets and Intel-
lectual Capital. Expensive patents are not necessarily the
answer—ideas, know-how and processes can and should be
secured inexpensively.A corollary of this is to assure that retir-
ing baby boomers are debriefed to retain the critical informa-
tion they have accumulated over the years. Zarrabian (2004)
reports that in 2005 there will be a staggering 39.7 million
Americans between 55 and 69 years old.Their skill and knowl-
edge is valuable beyond numbers! Don’t decide to let these sea-
soned pros leave the company without extensive debriefing.
Don’t Get the Wrong Investors or Wrong Partners
Involved with the Enterprise. I once spent the better part
of the first year in one venture unraveling—from my position
as board member—a situation where the smallest investor
was the crankiest, and the two company principals were
incompatible. The company survives, but the dysfunctional
staggering-and-reeling that these problems caused out of the
starting gate has extracted a significant price.
The Do’s—How to Operate Smarter and
Make Better Decisions
Keep Your Administrative Housekeeping in Order.
This discipline will save you time at critical junctures in
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decision-making when you want to focus on the merits of
the business issue, not on how to find a missing piece of
paper. The biggest administrative housekeeping chore, of
course, is to implement compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley
regulations.
Perform Due Diligence! If there’s one area that approx-
imates a Mulligan, it is due diligence. The Chinese fortune
cookie reads:“A peek is worth a thousand finesses!”In ventur-
ing, an intelligent peek represents both good offense and
good defense.As discussed earlier, there are ways to unearth
important data on competitors. For potential merger and
acquisition deals, due diligence is critical. Rosenberg (1996)
reports that fully 10 percent of M&A deals are cancelled
because of what is found in due diligence. In an additional 25
percent of the cases, the due diligence findings either cause
the deal to be altered or help the acquirer to negotiate a bet-
ter price. Similarly, due diligence may uncover facts about a
prospective executive hire that red lights certain factors.One
company found out through investigators that the leading
candidate for CEO was more than $100K in arrears in child
support payments! The situation was eventually resolved, but
the company made a more informed decision with the help
of due diligence.
Attract the Right Type of People. The entrepreneur
wants to make people decisions that result in a confident,
resilient organization:
 Harvard’s Kanter (2004) defines confidence as “the
sweet spot between arrogance and despair.Arrogance is
the failure to see any flaws; despair is the failure to
acknowledge any strengths.”
 Regarding resilience, Coutu (2002) notes that more than
education, experience or training, an individual’s level of
resilience will determine who succeeds and who fails.
This is true in the Olympics, the cancer ward and the
boardroom. Resilient people possess three characteris-
tics: a staunch sense of reality, a deep conviction that life
is meaningful, and a remarkable capacity to improvise.
Provide Praise. Rath and Clifton (2004) surveyed—
through Gallup—more than 4 million employees and found
that:
 Negative employees can scare off customers.
 Praise is an important leadership trait, helping to diffuse
whining, unappreciated staffers.
 Praise increases productivity,and praised employees gen-
erate higher loyalty and satisfaction scores from cus-
tomers. The results are better safety records and fewer
accidents on the job.
Always be Customer-sensitive.
 Revenue is the best way to fund the company.
 Customer -related decision-making is bolstered by data
mining, or business intelligence. Example # 1: A retail
mart decides to retain slow-moving French cheeses
because the informational tracking system tells them
that those people who do buy these overpriced cheeses
are the mart’s best customers. Example # 2: A pub can
use software to assess the impact that “happy hour”
offers have on daily sales. If discounting a particular
drink increases sales one day, that can be repeated.
Business intelligence provides the capacity to track
inventory accurately and reprice offerings dynamically.
Try to Be Creative. To cite an example:As a board mem-
ber of a business I cofounded, I became involved in a negoti-
ation with a large company that wanted to invest in our
emerging (publicly-traded) company so that we could further
our product development. Rather than have them become a
shareholder, I convinced all parties that the same ends could
be met by having the funds enter our company as contract-
ed R&D revenue—which on our part we could report as
sales with modest profits, not as a total R&D expense write-
off. The funding company could recoup its investment
through product royalties—for them, a much more straight-
forward exit position than equity. It was a win-win scenario
that rewarded creative decision-making.
Parting Shots
Building upon my opening sports metaphor, the opportunity
for success involves keeping it close on the back nine (golf)
and being within a run or two in the seventh inning (base-
ball). In the end, success generally occurs when everything is
on the line. In the game of entrepreneurship, good decisions,
with informed board of directors' oversight, are vital to com-
pany success. In this age of corporate governance, I can sum-
marize my observations on entrepreneurial decision-making
with 10 questions that a diligent director of the company
should ask. Compiled by Charan and Schlosser (2003), these
questions underscore how good entrepreneurs can and
should be directed to make good decisions.
1. How does the company make money?
2.Are customers paying up?
3.What could really hurt—or kill—the company in the
next few years?
4. How are we doing relative to our competitors?
5. If the CEO were hit by a bus tomorrow, who could run
this company?
6. How are we going to grow?
7.Are we living within our means?
8. How much does the CEO get paid?
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9. How does bad news get to the top?
10. Do I understand the answers to questions 1 through 9?
(If not, try again—decision-making is a process. Unlike
entrepreneurs, directors can be granted Mulligans.
They can ask questions over and over again until the
entrepreneur gets it right!)
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